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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
NO. 05-2332
                    
 RICKY COLEMAN; MARY B. BRAGGS;
STANLEY E. BATES
v.
TEXTRON, INC.; TEXTRON, INC. 1,
a/k/a/ d/b/a TEXTRON LYCOMING;
TEXTRON LYCOMING; AVCO CORPORATION
Ricky Coleman; Stanley E. Bates
Appellants
                    
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 02-cv-08881)
District Judge:  Hon. Clifford Scott Green
                   
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 19, 2006
BEFORE:  McKEE and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges,
and McCLURE,* District Judge
(Opinion Filed:  May 25, 2006)
                    
                                   
* Hon. James F. McClure, Jr., United States District Judge for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
2                    
OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
This is a race discrimination case.  Appellants Ricky Coleman and Stanley Bates
appeal from summary judgments entered by the District Court on two of their claims:  (1)
that they were discriminated against in the negotiation and implementation of a settlement
agreement between their employers and the National Labor Relations Board which
resolved a dispute regarding outsourcing; and (2) that they were victims of a hostile work
environment.  We will affirm.
I.
Appellants insist that the District Court committed reversible error by allowing
appellees to rely in support of their motion for summary judgment on appellants’ first
claim upon an affidavit of their deceased Vice President of Human Resources submitted
to the NLRB in 1997.  In appellants’ view this affidavit was not admissible in evidence. 
We need not resolve that issue, however, because appellees submitted ample admissible
evidence, independent of the challenged affidavit, to satisfy their burden under
McDonnell-Douglas of coming forward with “a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
its settlement practices.”  Op. at 13.    Appellees having come forward with sufficient
evidence to support a finding that such “a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” existed,
3the burden shifted to appellants to show that appellees’ proffered reason was pretextual. 
The District Court in this case granted summary judgment because “Plaintiffs [had]
offered no evidence that Defendants’ proffered reason for Plaintiffs’ treatment was
pretextual.”  App. at 13.  We Agree.
II.
In order to be successful with a hostile work environment claim against an
employer, a plaintiff must prove five things:
(1) the employee suffered intentional discrimination . . . ; (2) the
discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination
detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would
detrimentally affect a reasonable person . . . in that position; and (5)
respondeat superior liability existed.
Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 410 (3d Cir. 1997).  Here, the District Court granted
summary judgment because appellants had failed to “satisfy the 5th prong of the hostile
work environment test – the existence of respondeat superior.”  App. at 9.  It accepted
appellants’ description of their work conditions as true, but correctly found that they had
tendered no evidence tending to show “that the employer had knowledge of the
discrimination.”  Id.  In their briefing before us, appellants have identified no such
evidence, and we have found none.
III.
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
